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COMMUNITY ACTION AND MAXIMUM FEASIBLE
PARTICIPATION: AN OPPORTUNITY LOST BUT
NOT FORGOTTEN FOR EXPANDING
DEMOCRACY AT HOME
GEORGE ADLER*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Lyndon Johnson's 1971 autobiography, The Vantage Point:
Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-1969, he wrote, regarding the
Community Action Program (CAP) component of the war on
poverty: "This plan had the sound of something brand new and
even faintly radical. Actually, it was based on one of the oldest
ideas of our democracy, as old as the New England town meeting
- self-determination at the local level."' This venerable, democratic ideal contains other American values within it, such as selfreliance, community and a belief in the common good. The
Community Action Program (CAP) mandated "maximum feasible participation of residents of the areas and members of the
groups served," 2 recognizing that poverty and political powerlessness are inextricably bound together. This experiment in
expanded democracy generated considerable political conflict
and, eventually, the programs administered by the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) were "tamed" by transferring them to
other executive departments and the goal of maximum feasible
participation was abandoned. Over the course of the 1970s, conservative critics blamed the CAP for causing much of the turmoil
of the "sixties" in an attempt to both discredit federal involvement in promoting social change in our cities and the ability of
the poor to actively and productively engage in the political
process.
But I believe that Federal involvement per se was not the
problem. Nor do I believe that the history of that period proves
that those who exist "outside the usual boundaries of American
*
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1. LYNDON B. JOHNSON, THE VANTAGE POINT: PERSPECTIVES OF THE
PRESIDENCY, 1963-69, at 74 (1971).
2. Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, § 202(1) (3),
78 Stat. 508, 516 (1964).
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politics and American political discourse" 3 should remain there.
There clearly were many problems with the CAP, including ambiguities within the language of Title II of the Economic Opportunity Act, which created the CAP, and administrative confusion
within OEO itself. Perhaps the ambiguity of the legislative language originated in the naive belief of the theorists and planners
of the Community Action Program that consensus within local
communities could be easily reached, a naivete which left the
administrators of the CAP unprepared for the intensity of political conflict generated by the requirement to include the poor in
the process. This lack of preparation left the program politically
vulnerable to powerful forces satisfied with the status quo, forces
which wanted traditional social welfare spending, rather than the
institutionalization of social change as a requirement for receiving Federal funds. Lyndon Johnson's growing preoccupation
with the Vietnam War exacerbated this political vulnerability,
since it diverted Johnson's political expertise and leadership
away from the war on poverty when that leadership was essential
to withstand the conflicts inherent in effecting institutional
reform. These problems defeated what was arguably one of the
most interesting attempts by the Federal Government to institutionalize the involvement of the poor in the political process in
our country's history. Through a brief examination of these
shortcomings, I believe it is possible to come to a tentative understanding of why that worthy attempt failed so that we as a nation
can avoid those problems of policy implementation in the future
rather than abandon an ideal which is so intimately ingrained in
the American tradition.
II.

CAP:

THE AMBIGUITY OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT

Lyndon Johnson, in his State of the Union Message to Congress in January, 1964, declared a "war on poverty." The "official
case" for a war on poverty was documented in The Economic
Report of the President, 1964,' written by Walter Heller and
others on the Council of Economic Advisors, (a report initiated
under President Kennedy. In general terms, this report
described poverty in the United States much as Michael Harrington had in The Other America in 1962).' John Donovan summa3.

JOHN C. DONOVAN, THE POLITICS OF POVERTY 141 (2d ed. 1973).

4.

COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT
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5.

MICHAEL HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA: POVER-TY IN THE UNITED
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rizes this view of what it means to be poor in America in The
Politics of Poverty:
Poverty in the United States, if it means anything, decrees
that its victims shall not participate in the diverse opportunities which the world's richest economy provides almost
as a matter of course for those millions of its citizens who
are not poor. As a social phenomenon, poverty in this
country means poor schools, bad neighborhoods, some of
the worst housing in Western industrialized civilization,
poor health, and extraordinarily poor prospects for effecting any fundamental change in the "system."6
Johnson appointed an ad hoc task force, headed by Sargent
Shriver, to draw up legislation for his war on poverty near the
end of January 1964. Those in the task force who wrote the legislation (which became the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964)
conceived of poverty as a complex problem requiring a comprehensive approach, an approach influenced in large part by the
research and pilot projects funded by the Ford Foundation in its
"grey areas program" andJohn F. Kennedy's President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency. Title II of the Act, which became
the basis for the community action programs, stated in Section
202 (a) (3) that local Community Action Agencies must be
"developed, conducted, and administered with the maximum
feasible participation of residents of the areas and members of
the groups served."7 Attorney General Robert Kennedy acted as
administration spokesman for Title II. In testimony before Congress urging passage of the Act, Kennedy explained the requirement of "maximum feasible participation" this way:
The institutions which affect the poor - education, welfare,
recreation, business, labor - are huge, complex structures,
operating far outside their control. They plan programs
for the poor, not with them. Part of the sense of helplessness and futility comes from the feeling of powerlessness to
affect the operation of these organizations.
The community action programs must basically change
these organizations by building into the program real representation for the poor. This bill calls for, "maximum feasible participation of residents." This means the

6. DONOVAN, supra note 3, at 93-94.
7. Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, § 202(a) (3),
78 Stat. 508, 516 (1964).

550

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 8

involvement of the poor in planning and implementing
8
programs: giving them a real voice in their institutions.
In Kennedy's explanation, the terms "residents" and "the poor"
were interchangeable and this interpretation of the legislative
language became virtually universal, though the exact meaning
of "the poor" was left undefined. Surprisingly, there was little
scrutiny by Congress of what was by far the most experimental
initiative for institutionalizing social change since the New Deal
of the early 1930s, due to its required participation of the poor.
The Economic Opportunity Act, the legislative centerpiece of the
Johnson Administration's war on poverty, was passed by Congress
in August 1964. The Act established the Office of Economic
Opportunity (OEO) as the new Federal agency, located in the
Executive Office of the President, with the responsibility for
administering the funds appropriated.
Those administering the CAP established guidelines for
funding which were very broad in order to encourage local communities to define their own priorities in terms of solving local
problems. There were three general ways in which a Community
Action Agency could attack poverty. Communities could
develop: 1) employment strategies, providing jobs and job training; 2) community organization strategies, assisting the poor in
gaining "enough confidence in their own power to set about
making their way in the environment and even, occasionally,
attempting to change that environment;"' and/or 3) delivery of
services strategies, where they could focus on improving "educational, medical, legal, and other social services."' 0 The mandate
that there be "maximum feasible participation" by the people in
the area being served by the local Community Action Agency
(CAA), was not only to increase participation of the poor in the
process of eliminating poverty, but to create a structure which
would induce important segments of the community to work
together so as not to duplicate services and to better utilize
existing services. One of the anticipated benefits of this
approach was to actually build community by getting people
within the city to work together.

8. Economic Opportunity Act of 1964: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the War
on Poverty Program of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 88th Cong., 2nd

Sess., pt. 1, at 305 (1964).
9. John G. Wofford, The Politics of Local Responsibility: Administration of the
Community Action Program, 1964-1966, in ON FIGHTING POVERTY' PERSPECTIVES
FROM EXPERIENCE 70, 71-72 (James L. Sundquist ed., 1969).

10.

Id.at 72.
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An early CAP pamphlet entitled "A Hometown Fight"
explained the approach while encouraging communities to apply
for Federal funds:
The Community Action Program reflects confidence
in the ability of individual communities to organize and
carry out anti-poverty programs tailored to local needs and
priorities....
Local community action programs should be broadly
based, involving representatives of the chief elected officials of the community, key public and private agencies
and representatives of the poor themselves.
Community action programs should see that existing
local, state and federal programs are linked in a concentrated drive against poverty. They should fuse older programs which have proved effective with new attacks against
the varied problems confronting the poor....
The major goal of community action programs is to
help individuals help themselves. Inherent in this
approach is the conviction that the poor should play an
active part in helping to develop, manage and work in
community action programs."
John Wofford, who was the deputy director in charge of
administering the CAP, pointed out that those in the Federal
Government who conceived the idea of the CAP felt that "[t] here
was to be no federal blueprint, no magic formula worked out in
Washington that would be imposed on local problems. Federal
standards were to be held to the minimum required under the
Act ...."2 Part of the reason for this was because it was believed
that local people knew their own problems best, but also because
"the fear of federal domination over local affairs was so strong in
Congress and in city halls that the problem of designing pro13
grams to meet local needs was left squarely with the localities."
This required the communities themselves to do the planning
and coordinating of local resources and services, most of which
were diffused and isolated throughout the community. The process of planning, which required "linking" programs together,
was itself "conceived as the first and one of the most important
forms of community action." 4
11.

Id. at 75.

12.

Id.

13.
14.

Id. at 75-76.
Id. at 76.
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As Sargent Shriver, the head of OEO, viewed the general
intention of the CAP:
Community action was not federal action; it was not state
action; it was not city-hall action; it was not health-and-welfare-council action; it was not action by business or labor; it
was not action by the poor - it was none of these alone, but
15
it was all of these together; in short -community action.
Though a broadly-based, coordinated effort drawing on all portions of the community concerned with poverty was strongly
advocated by OEO, it was not required by the Act. Congresswoman Edith Green (D. - Oregon) had feared that a coordinating effort of this kind would require a long planning period,
while some pre-existing institutions were ready to get started
immediately, so she had the requirement of coordinating efforts
stricken from the bill. The result was that an independent
agency, acting alone, having formulated a good program ready
to be implemented, could request funds directly from OEO in
Washington. This change proved to have significant consequences. It could have provided OEO with tremendous leverage
in support of the "maximum feasible participation" language of
the Act, though at the time, the political implications of this leverage were inadequately planned for.
Community action sought to coordinate social services
through a concerted effort of the entire community, including
the poor themselves, and thus build community. This activity was
predicated on a consensual decision making process which the
original planners spent little time thinking through. However,
had an organization been ready to get started right away
independent of the rest of the local community - either because
the community at large was slow in getting organized or because
the independent organization sought to change local institutions
and so stood outside the elite "consensus" - the language of the
Act allowed direct funding of that organization, thus potentially
aggravating pre-existing adversarial relationships. And herein lay
the ambiguity of Title II. The hope for community consensus
and the desire to empower the poor in order to foster reform of
social welfare institutions inevitably produced conflict. Which
was the higher priority? As James Sundquist, who served on the
original Shriver task force, posed the dilemma:
What was unsettled, essentially, was the issue that had been
defined in the long debate on the strategy for combating
juvenile delinquency. In the war on poverty, as in the war
15.

Id. at 77.
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on youth crime, was the target the individual or the community? Could poverty be eliminated by providing opportunity, or resources, to the individual within the existing
"social setting" in Cloward's and Ohlin's phrase, or was it
necessary to alter that setting, as they concluded, to heal
the "sick community," to shatter and remake the "culture
of poverty"? 6
III.

THE

SEARCH FOR CONSENSUS IN AN ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY

John Wofford wrote that the intensity of the reaction from
local politicians to the funding of independent agencies took
those administering the CAP "somewhat by surprise."7 The
naive assumption on which the CAP was built was that, given the
inducement (i.e., Federal dollars), communities could come
together to work toward the solution of a common problem, in
this case the elimination of poverty, including in the process the
poor themselves. As John Donovan described it, "The evidence
available suggests that the Johnson war on poverty was conceived
in a mood of political optimism which bordered on naivete.""8
In other words, they believed that disparate groups within the
community would be able to come together and arrive at a consensus concerning the "common good," even if it produced
heated disagreements within local politics in the process of arriving at a consensus. But the people in Washington did believe a
consensus could be reached, though they also recognized the political nature of the funding: "If politics is basically the struggle of
groups over policy and power, and control over funds and programs is a form of power, then - for better or worse - poverty and
politics were inextricably bound together." 9 This naivete concerning the complexity of consensual decision making in an
adversarial polity explains the administrators' "surprise" in Washington. Given the social, political and racial tensions of the sixties, in addition to the animosity many civil rights groups and the
poor felt toward municipal political machines, in many cities
around the country, particularly, but not only, in the South, consensus was more of an ideal goal than a political possibility.
A problem which developed in Mississippi in 1965 provides
an excellent example of the political conflicts generated by OEO
funding of an independent organization. Grassroots civil rights
16. JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, POLITICS AND POLIcY: THE EISENHOWER, KENNEDY,
AND JOHNSON YEARS 152 (1968).
17.
18.
19.

Wofford, supra note 9, at 79.
DONOVAN, supra note 3, at 113.
Wofford, supra note 9, at 79.
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organizations, including the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE)
and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC),
had organized throughout the state and had drawn up a plan for
a large-scale Head Start program. These groups formed a nonprofit organization called the Child Development Group of Mississippi (CDGM) to carry out this program over the summer of
1965. CDGM enrolled approximately six thousand children
between the ages of three and five. They were taught in eightyfour "centers" in twenty Mississippi Counties. Many of the centers were small black churches, renovated abandoned houses and
in some cases, classes were actually held outdoors under the
shade of trees.2 ° CDGM organized within the black community,
though the program was open to all. Most of the employees of
the CDGM were black; many were veterans of the civil rights
movement. OEO funded the program for the summer of 1965, a
grant of $1.4 million, and the results, as Wofford says, were
extremely successful.
After this first summer, Mississippi Democratic Senator John
Stennis, a powerful senior member of the Senate Appropriations
Committee and a committed segregationist, initiated an investigation of CDGM, claiming mismanagement of funds. While
there were in fact administrative weaknesses within the program,
there appeared to be no problems which technical assistance
from OEO could not remedy. Inefficient bookkeeping is typical
of local community organizations which "make full use of nonprofessionals."2 1 In response to the Senator's criticism and in
support of CDGM, Shriver testified: "Because of this program,
5,280 Mississippi children received the education, the medical
care, the social welfare services, and in some cases 22even the
clothes, the like of which they never before enjoyed."
Despite the Senator's opposition, in February, 1966 OEO
announced final approval of a grant of $5.6 million to CDGM to
expand their Head Start program for the following year. In
response, Stennis, Senator James Eastland and Representative
John Bell Williams (all Democrats from Mississippi) attacked the
decision, charging OEO with "remarkably poor judgement ...
[and] a complete disregard for the law passed by Congress."23
(The law referred to was an amendment in 1965 which required
that "OEO grant recipients were qualified to administer funds
and programs and would make their records available to the
supra note 3, at 83.

20.

DONOVAN,

21.
22.

Id. at 84.
Wallace Turner, Congress Criticalof Shriver Office, Curbs Poverty Program,

N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1965, at A19.
23. DONOVAN, supra note 3, at 85.
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General Accounting Office, Congress' favorite fiscal watchdog."2 4 ) The Mississippi segregationists in Congress certainly
were as concerned with the existence in their State of a Head
Start program run by civil rights workers operating outside the
segregated school establishment, as they were with sub-standard
bookkeeping. Seven months later, OEO announced that they
were cutting off funding of CDGM due to fiscal and administrative deficiencies and that the Program would be taken over by a
new organization, Mississippi Action for Progress (MAP). OEO
funded the organization with a grant of $2 million even before
MAP's application arrived in Washington,2 5 clearly a highly irregular (i.e., political) move. Though there is a question of how
MAP came into being - was it initiated by the White House or
within OEO itself? - the tensions exposed by the conflict regarding OEO's basic purpose clearly came into public view: "how far
should OEO go in promoting social and political change within a
community; how far could it go and still obtain a high level of
funding from an appropriations committee
on which Senator
26
Stennis' influence is far from minor?"
When push came to shove, the white voters of Mississippi,
and their powerful Democratic Senators in Congress, proved
they had more clout in Washington than grassroots civil rights
organizations. OEO's decision to cut off funding to CDGM, perceived as immoral political expediency by black activists, further
alienated people who were already questioning the Federal Government's commitment to social change. Without a clear sense
of purpose, OEO lost valuable credibility with conservative elites,
liberals and national civil rights organizations, as well as the people the programs were designed to serve and empower.
Of course, it should also be remembered that the Johnson
Administration, and national liberal opinion, solidly supported
the goal of integration. For the Federal Government to fund two
separate programs which were essentially racially based was, at
that time, politically impossible. Due in part to its own naivete,
and without a clear policy of how to deal with seemingly irreconcilable conflicts, OEO found itself in a no-win situation. Politically, OEO was immeasurably weakened by the failure of Lyndon
Johnson to publicly and loudly come out in support of his own
war on poverty, explaining the goals and the values inherent in
working toward them, while quietly strong-arming consensus
behind the scenes in his own inimitable way. However, he did
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 84.
Id. at 86.
Id.
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not and the message seemed to be that when conflict surfaced
between OEO and the entrenched powers of the status quo,
Shriver would back down and the powerless would remain without power.
The maximum -feasible participation of the poor requirement of the war on poverty also produced conflicts in major cities outside the South. When Johnson announced the war on
poverty in January 1964, the U.S. Conference of Mayors was one
of the few national organizations which voiced strong support for
the new initiative. However, once the realization set in that OEO
was serious about local community action agencies including the
poor, the attitudes of many big city mayors changed abruptly.
Some mayors expected to use the new Federal funds to
strengthen their own political machines. For example, Mayor
Richard Daley named himself head of the local Community
Action Agency (CAA) in Chicago and placed many City officials
on its governing board. Daley appointed a black civil servant and
educator (Dr. Deton Brooks) as executive director and chose two
middle-class blacks to act as representatives of the poor on the
board. Dr. Brooks, in turn, appointed the directors of the program's dozen neighborhood service centers; and these directors
appointed the poor who sat on the neighborhood advisory councils. 7 In addition, critics alleged, not without evidence, that job
applicants with letters of recommendation from precinct captains and aldermen had the inside track.2" Through this kind of
patronage, Daley used CAP funds as a means of extending and
solidifying his base of power. He and his political machine set up
the CAA in such a way to use federal dollars intended to reform
institutions and give greater power to the poor as a means to
prevent either from happening.
Daley's intent becomes clearer when looking at those local
organizations which were not allowed to participate in his CAA.
For example, The Woodlawn Organization (T.W.O.), located in
the black slum south of the University of Chicago, was a federation of some eighty-five or ninety representative community
groups "including thirteen churches (virtually all the churches of
any influence in the community), three businessmen's associa27. Examination of the War on Poverty Program:Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on War on Poverty Program of the House Comm. of Education and Labor, 89th

Congress, 1st Sess. 348-350 (1965) [hereinafter Examination of the War on Poverty
Program] (statement of Deton Brooks, Executive Director of the Chicago
Community Action Agency).
28.

Lois Willie, PoliticalFeelers Start to Go Out for Plums in Poverty War Pie,

CHI. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 8, 1965, reprinted in Examination of the War on Poverty

Program, supra note 26, at 355-357.
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tions, and an assortment of block clubs, neighborhood associations, and social groups of one sort or another."2 9 T.W.O. had
organized successful rent strikes against slumlords who had
refused to bring their properties up to code, protested against
overcrowded schools in the community, and successfully prevented the University of Chicago from carrying out their South
Campus expansion and urban renewal project in 1960, which the
University had tried to rush through the planning process
despite the opposition of the residents and business people in
the area. This was exactly the type of organization whose inclusion in the CAA was mandated by the Act. But their participation
was not "requested" by Mayor Daley's CAA. The president of
T.W.O., Reverend Lynwood Stevenson, complained before a congressional committee of being excluded from the CAA, saying,
"In Chicago, there is no war on poverty, there is only more of the
ancient galling war against the poor."' ° This criticism received
national headlines in the press. OEO suggested that Daley
reform his program to be more truly inclusive.
In response, Daley, along with other mayors, attacked the
CAP at the annual meeting of the U.S. Conference of Mayors in
1965, claiming that OEO was implicitly endorsing "class struggle." In a private meeting arranged later with Vice-President
Hubert Humphrey, Daley led a group of ten mayors who
"expressed their concern that OEO seems to be operating on the
theory that existing institutions in society are antagonistic to the
poor or unwilling to make changes necessary in their structures
to effectively lead the war against poverty," 3 1 an observation
which was essentially true. The original planners of the war on
poverty did believe that existing institutions were generally unresponsive to the needs and concerns of the poor and that the only
effective way to pressure those institutions to become more
responsive was to redistribute power to those being served.
Daley's actions, and the actions of other mayors who headed
strong political machines, lent considerable credence to that
social diagnosis. However, Daley, who as the most powerful Democrat in Illinois was effective in delivering votes in presidential
and other national elections, applied pressure on Humphrey.
The Vice-President, in turn, was able to pressure OEO to
acknowledge that "the success of the program depends heavily
29.

CHARLES E. SILBERMAN, CRISIS IN BLACK AND WHITE 319 (1964).
30. Examination of the War on Poverty Program, supra note 27, at 360
(statement of Reverend Lynwood Stevenson).
31. ALLEN J. MATUSOW, THE UNRAVELING OF AMERICA: A HISTORY OF
LIBERALISM IN THE 1960s 250 (1984).
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on very extensive leadership by local government;" 32 in other
words, do not question too closely local elites' choices of representatives of the poor. Once again, the naivete of the planners of
the war on poverty concerning the intimate connection between
local and national politics, the intricacies of local politics and the
ability of local communities to achieve consensus created controversy which Shriver and OEO staff were politically unable to confront without the active support of the President. Federal efforts
to institutionalize effective political participation of the poor at
the local level were short lived. As early as 1967, Congress voted
in favor of an amendment introduced by Representative Edith
Green requiring that all OEO funds, beginning in fiscal year
1968, be channeled through local governments.
IV.

ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS WITHIN THE
COMMUNITY ACTION PROGRAM

OEO faced administrative and bureaucratic problems right
from its inception. As a major new initiative, which would distinguish Lyndon Johnson from his predecessor, the President
wanted the program up and running as quickly as possible.
Shriver's task force had only begun writing the legislation in January, 1964; the Economic Opportunity Act passed Congress in
August, 1964 and OEO's $800 million appropriation came
through in October of the same year; a remarkably short timeframe. Though the actual granting of funds was held up (a political decision of the White House) until after the election in
November, this meant that a large new agency responsible for
spending $800 million dollars in fiscal year 1964 had only a few
months, starting from scratch, to set up its administrative apparatus and then had only a few more months to award grants and
show results before going to Congress to ask for the next year's
appropriation. This race against the political clock pressured
OEO to establish guidelines and work out procedures as it went
along, inhibiting staff ability to do careful long-range planning.
Additionally, OEO was responsible administratively for both
coordinating programs with other Executive Departments
(Labor, Justice, etc.) while at the same time directly organizing
and funding programs of its own. This set the stage for future
bureaucratic conflict and turf wars out of which OEO would
eventually emerge the loser.
Wofford discussed many of the problems confronting the
administrators in getting the program off the ground. Between
32.

Id.
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August and November 1964, community representatives from
around the country visited the Washington office of OEO. OEO
staff would discuss with them their draft applications for funding
and ask, among other questions, "whether representatives of the
poor had participated in developing the proposed program to
the 'maximum feasible' extent."3 3 The reply from these "representatives," who were "usually sent because the mayor had put
together a small group of influential local leaders," was usually,
"' [w]ell, not very much, but about as much as was feasible. We
needed to move fast."' 34 This type of answer satisfied the OEO
staff until the telegrams started pouring in from around the
country "addressed to Mr. Shriver, to the congressman for the
district, to senators, to the President, protesting the alleged failure of the 'mayor's committee' to consult the residents of the
area."3 5 OEO then tried to mediate between the contending
groups, which of course meant delay. Often those dissatisfied
with OEO mediation took their complaints to the local newspaper and sent letters to their Congressman. This whole process
appeared to the general public, which had not been adequately
educated as to the goals of the war on poverty, and to some of
those intimately involved, as a "political mess," on the one hand,
or as a contest between the "establishment" and civil rights and
protest organizations, on the other. However, as Wofford
pointed out, this was to be expected; an important part of the
war on poverty was to create this debate, and through a negotiating process within the community (if necessary, with the OEO as
mediator) to arrive at a local consensus. However, this became a
major problem, Wofford said, both because the intensity of conflict was greater than anticipated and because "there was not
enough straight talk either from OEO or from local officials to
make it clear that some controversy Was inevitable and, in most
cases, healthy."3 6 But that clarification was not forthcoming. As
John Donovan described it:
Whether the war on poverty was the creature of presidential consensus politics or professionalized reform, or a
combination of the two, no great sense of struggle, conflict, or commitment was communicated to the American
public, despite the fact that the program was designed
largely in response to the Negro equal rights crisis.3 7
33.
34.
35.
36.

Wofford, supra note 9, at 80.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 81.

37.

DONOVAN,

supra note 3, at 115.
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Major administrative and political problems resulted from
the lack of "straight talk" because it left the purpose of the new
agency unclear. OEO could have clearly stated its purpose in
both political and moral terms if the war on poverty had been
better understood as a federal response to the just demands of
the civil rights movement for effectively including minorities and
the poor in the political process. It should be remembered that
in 1910 over eighty-seven percent of all black Americans lived in
what had been the eleven states of the Old Confederacy and that
"the 1960 census revealed that the figure had been reduced to
fifty-six percent," and was still declining.38 This migration of African Americans from the rural South to the industrial cities of the
North, the largest internal migration in American history, exacerbated problems of segregation and poverty in cities which were
just beginning to feel the effects of restrictions in the opportunity structure for unskilled workers due to the increased mechanization of industry. The purpose of OEO could have been
defined both in terms of social and participatory justice (to win
support from civil rights leaders and liberals) and as a long term
social and educative policy for gradually bringing the excluded
into the system in a controlled manner, thus preventing the
development of a self-perpetuating underclass of unskilled and
alienated people. This could have pressured the status quo to
accept sharing responsibilities with previously powerless groups,
particularly had Johnson used the Presidency as a bully pulpit to
educate the public about the long-term pragmatism of the policy,
while appealing to the people's sense of justice. Unfortunately,
this did not happen.
This lack of clarity regarding the purpose of OEO led to
other administrative mistakes, including the initial decision to
make funds available to every county, city and small town in the
country, rather than restrict eligibility, for the purposes of funding pilot programs. But OEO knew they needed to maintain
Congressional support; hence every Congressional district was
eligible to apply for funds. They hoped that this method would
also garner broad based public support. However, OEO staff
knew that there were very poor counties with so few local
resources that they would never be able to develop the programs
they needed without outside help. Hence, "technical assistance"
grants were made available to states, so that state agencies could
provide the assistance needed in the poorest of counties. But the
problem which developed from the decision to make the funds
available to every county in the country was that it inevitably
38.

Id. at 104.
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raised expectations which could only be fulfilled if Congress continued to appropriate more and more funds each year. This did
not happen, perhaps in part because Congressional leaders were
not involved in drafting the legislation in the first place, and so
had little personal stake in its success; perhaps because the long
term implications of the Act were poorly understood or actively
feared. In any event, funds increasingly were earmarked for specific kinds of programs, like Head Start, reducing the ability of
OEO staff to provide substantial funding to other deserving and
more innovative programs, ones which could have politically
empowered indigenous neighborhood groups. At the same
time, appropriations decreased, due in part to the election in
1966 of a more conservative Congress and the continuing escalation of the war in Vietnam, making it more and more difficult
even to maintain funding for successful domestic programs.
The granting of funds in itself was inherently political. Inevitably many communities had to contact OEO to see if the plan
they were developing would be funded or what needed to be
changed or added to make it eligible for funding, particularly
regarding the "maximum feasible participation" requirement.
Because of the time required to have staff experts in Washington
review only that section of a proposal relating to their own area
of expertise, making sure that any problems with that section of
the proposal had been worked out to his or her satisfaction
before passing it on to another expert's desk, and so on, OEO
decided to take a different approach. The power of "essential
review" of all proposals was put in the hands of "field representatives," who set up regional offices from which they could go out
into the field to help mediate conflicts in communities and help
them put together grant requests. OEO in Washington relied on
the judgement of the field representative: if he urged OEO to
fund a particular community action program, Washington would
generally accept the judgement and expedite the flow of funds,
avoiding the delays required of having a series of experts review
the proposals. But again, if local politicians felt the field representative was overly sympathetic to the concerns and desires of
neighborhood organizations, many went over his head and contacted the Washington office directly. It was often felt that the
field representative was acting arbit rarily, if for example, he
refuse'd to support a program that had only ten or twenty percent
minority or poor representation on the local governing body of
the CAP. It is true that the field representative, who was a highly
skilled professional, had no choice but to make prudential judgements based on what he understood as the intention of the Act.
The disagreements between local officials and field representa-
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tives eventually led to experts being called in to review proposals,
and resulted in the very problem OEO had at first tried to avoid.
As I have already mentioned, the priorities written into the
legislation were very general in order to encourage local initiative and the local setting of priorities. But this lack of focus, however well intentioned, backfired. It was part of the reason for the
intensity of conflict which resulted. Different groups within communities each wanted to emphasize different priorities - community groups wanted to promote social organization of the poor;
social service agencies wanted to expand their services; and local
governments wanted to control the flow of funds to maintain
their traditional power. In some communities, such as New York
City, Chicago and Detroit, with strong political machines and
large numbers of minorities and poor, it was nearly impossible to
reach consensus across such a wide spectrum of interests. This
dissension was furthered by the lack of direction in the legislative
guidelines. The result, as Wofford described it:
The objective of maintaining administrative flexibility
in establishing priorities so that the local communities can
do it for themselves . . . resulted for the most part, in the
absence of any priorities at all. And community action
without community priorities is almost a contradiction in
terms.

39

I believe the priorities were left wide open to pacify the fears
of those who resented and feared federal control of local affairs.
On the more positive side, they were set so broadly to induce
counties and cities to coordinate the current social services in
their jurisdictions and to reward them with grants for creating
others to fill perceived gaps in services. An unemployed person
who goes to an unemployment office, for example, may be on
the verge of eviction. The caseworker at the unemployment
office needs to know where the man can go to possibly receive
help with the rent and then refer him there. The same goes for a
single mother: she may need help with food, childcare, job training, protection from an abuser, etc. At the time of the war on
poverty, local agencies, public and private, provided their own
particular social service in isolation from each other and little or
no help was available for the person seeking it in trying to find
his or her way through the bureaucratic anarchy of private charities and government agencies. This lack of coordination was
frustrating for the person needing help, and self-defeating as
public policy. The coordination of services which the CAP
39.

Wofford, supra note 9, at 97.

1994]

COMMUNITY ACTION

strongly urged was a good administrativeidea. But it could have
been achieved without participation of the poor, making it a
means of coordinating traditional New Deal style social programs. This would surely. have been an improvement, but it
would have avoided the more fundamental issue of the political
powerlessness and alienation of the poor. The requirement of
"maximum feasible participation" and the ability of OEO to fund
independent organizations did address that problem. The mistake of combining these two quite different policies in the same
legislation derived, perhaps, from the planners assumption that
communities, while including the poor in the process, could
arrive at consensus. But the times would not allow it. As John
Wofford wrote, "Community action . .. was attempting to reach
community consensus at a time when race, politics, and poverty
were pulling communities and the nation apart."4"
However, today we have the benefit of exhaustive studies of
unitary or consensual decision making processes, conceptual and
empirical tools which the theorists and administrators of the CAP
lacked. Jane Mansbridge, who has studied consensual decision
making as thoroughly as one can, has come to the conclusion
that in modern nation-states, owing to the size and diversity of
their populations, even when consensus is the goal, a combination of consensual and adversarial decision rules must be
employed. And in an adversarial democracy such as the U.S. the
closest one can come to the "equal protection of interests" (a
fundamental normative value in democratic theory) is through
pursuing a policy of "proportionate outcomes" or "proportional
distribution of benefits." 4 ' A greater understanding of the complexities involved in consensual decision making on the part of
OEO theorists and staff would have clarified the need, in a pluralist democracy, to use adversarial methods, such as proportionate outcomes, for the purpose, not of fostering conflict per se,
but as a means of applying pressure on recalcitrant groups. In
the case of the conflict in Mississippi referred to earlier, since
consensus appeared impossible, perhaps the most just outcome
would have been to divide up funds proportionately between
CDGM and MAP, while simultaneously pressuring them both to
work together whenever possible. This approach would have
accepted short term conflict as an inevitable part of an ultimately
healthy long term process.

40. Id. at 100.
41.
1983).
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The direct funding of independent agencies, bypassing local
government, was a good idea in that respect. It encouraged
innovation and program development, while decentralizing
power in the city, thus giving areas previously ignored real leverage with local institutions and elites. Saul Alinsky, the community organizer, was an outspoken critic of the war on poverty, but
he believed the poor could be empowered in a meaningful way
through direct, federal funding of independent organizations.
This would require that local authorities or local City Halls
be by-passed. That specially trained federal representatives
who are in sympathy with the spirit of independence, have
a faith in the democratic credo, in opposition to the welfare colonialism of the social welfare industry or that of
City Halls, be sent into local communities . . . When they
enter a community of the poor which is organized by a militant independent organization such as T.W.O. in Woodlawn, that they recognize and respect them and work out
programs with and through this kind of an organization.
That when these federal agents come in to a community
which is not organized that they will then begin to search
out for those leaders of vital interest, those leaders defined
by substantial
parts of the community as leaders and
42
spokesmen.
I agree with Alinsky that the direct funding of organizations
which could independently provide important services currently
lacking in the area was an excellent idea, even if the political
realities of the locality require that it be federal representatives
who acknowledge, respect and partially fund the organization.
This policy recognizes and encourages belief in the worth and
dignity of all persons by seeking to bring people previously
excluded into the political process. Coordinating social services
without the participation of the poor merely created a more efficient form of "welfare colonialism," in Alinsky's derisive phrase:
in which government and private agencies do for the poor, rather
than work with the poor. To redistribute power to the poor can
not help but generate short term conflict and so is in direct
opposition to the idea of working to achieve community wide
consensus. Both approaches had strengths, but placed in the
same piece of legislation it created ambiguity regarding legislative intent, making it difficult to clearly explain the meaning and
purpose of a war on poverty when the inevitable conflicts arose.
42.
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I disagree with those, like Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who
blame the war on poverty with the urban violence of the midsixties, because it ignores too many other concurrent developments and provides us with no guidance for the future. It would
be more accurate to say, as John Donovan did in the early 1970s,
that the war on poverty was never really fought:
...[I]

t is obvious that the antipoverty program of the 1960s

did not constitute a real "war" against poverty. The major
battles in such a war were never fought. Throughout its
history, the antipoverty program has been limited in every
important respect: narrow in scope, conceptually ambiguous, inadequately funded, and lacking in sustained support
in the White3 House, in the Congress, and among the gen4

eral public.

For a policy initiative of such scope, moral and political leadership was essential, but leaders failed to respond to the opportunity due to their preoccupation with the war in Vietnam and the
business-as-usual, pork barrel politics of the entrenched status
quo.
V.

LESSONS LEARNED

One of the major problems in the war on poverty can be
found in the basic ambiguity in Title II of the Economic Opportunity Act: was the intent of the legislation to improve, through
coordination, the delivery of social services for the poor; or was it
to mandate the involvement of the poor in the funding, hence
the political, process? Which had greater priority? Pushing for
the coordination of social services at the local level represents an
attempt at administrative reform which, while certainly of benefit
to the poor, does not address the more fundamental issues of
economic and political powerlessness of the poor. Only through
building administrative structures which mandate the inclusion in
the political process of those traditionally excluded can real, long
term change take place. The direct, Federal funding of
independent, neighborhood organizations represents the
attempt to do just that. However, in the political battle resulting
from the conflict between these two approaches, the administrative reform of coordinating social services, for political and budgetary reasons, won out; actual Federal funding for the purposes
of expanding democratic participation at the local level was discontinued. But the idea survived, as Alan A. Altshuler, writing in
1970, after examining the "black demand for political participa43. DONOVAN, supra note 3, at 168.
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tion in the larger cities," concluded: "The whole current movement for neighborhood control was largely set in motion by the
'maximum feasible participation' provision of the Economic
Opportunity Act of 1964." 44
More recently, Jeffrey M. Berry, Kent E. Portney and Ken
Thomson have demonstrated the positive political effects in
municipalities - such as in Birmingham, Alabama and St. Paul,
Minnesota - which have given limited but- real decision making
powers to neighborhood organizations. They have found that
even those decisions are accepted, if made by the neighborhood
organization, with which people in the area affected have disagreed because of the perceived legitimacy of the decision making process itself.4 5
Expanding effective democratic
participation actually strengthens the political system in the long
term, even if conflicts are generated in the short term.
But real support for this effort must come from the Federal
Government, for reasons explained by Jane Mansbridge:
...large

units [of government] do seem to be more redis-

tributive than small ones. The federal government, for
example, spends more per capita on programs directed
specifically at the poor than state governments do, and
state governments spend more than local governments....
The evidence, then, points in two directions. The trappings of power appear to be more equally distributed
between rich and poor in smaller units, suggesting that the
interests of the poor should be more equally protected.
But direct analysis of outcomes suggests that the interests
46
of the poor are better protected in larger units.

Without using the term, Mansbridge is describing the concept of
subsidiarity, an example of which is admirably demonstrated in
OEO's funding of independent neighborhood organizations.
This effort was an attempt to increase the organization's ability to
participate in the political process rather than reduce the people
of the area to a greater degree of dependence on a local welfare
system perceived as indifferent to their real needs. I would grant
that, in the short term, it is more politically feasible to continue
funding existing social service institutions which have reason to
support the status quo, rather than seek to draw into the political
process the unskilled and alienated members of a poverty
stricken underclass and to cultivate the indigenous leaders
among them. Inevitably, this promises conflict. But it can also
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 174.
JEFFREY BERRY ET AL., THE REBIRTH OF URBAN DEmOCRACY
MANSBRIDGE, supra note 41, at 280-281.
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increase the stability of our political system in the long term
through a concerted effort to actually realize our democratic ideals at home because the educative aspect of democratic participation is ultimately a stabilizing force. To carry out a domestic
policy of this scope, the moral and political leadership of the
President and Congress is essential: I think I have demonstrated
what can happen when that leadership is lacking. Legislative
intent must be clear and conflict must be planned for. Consensus and the common good is the sought after goal; the clash of
interests is the present reality. We can, as a nation, learn from
past mistakes.
VI.

EXPANDING DEMOCRACY IN THE 1990s

How can the lessons learned from the attempt made by the
war on poverty to expand democratic participation in American
cities be applied thirty years later? To begin with, it must be
pointed out that thirty years after President Johnson announced
a war on poverty, the problems of our cities have worsened, due
in part to profound structural changes in the American economy
and massive disinvestment from the cities and investment in the
surrounding suburbs. In areas of concentrated poverty, the
mediating institutions which provide the emotional and spiritual
infrastructure of life in a democracy-the family, churches,
schools, small businesses, voluntary organizations, political parties-have decayed concurrently with the real estate, leaving a
spiritual landscape as ominous as the physical one. In this environment, which William Julius Wilson describes as "social isolation,"' institutions of traditional, democratic life become
irrelevant to the citizens of the "underclass" and are replaced by
the more socio-pathological institutions of gangs and the underground economy. The poverty, the drugs, the violence and the
despair which permeate these devastated communities represent
a challenge of monumental proportions to policy makers, and all
Americans who believe in the democratic ideals which form the
basis of our society.
I suggest that we need to think about the problem differently than policy makers did in the sixties, incorporating the
ideas of subsidiarity and participatory justice. The language of
maximum feasible participation in the Economic Opportunity
Act, which was drawn from the New Left's idea of participatory
democracy, focused, in the classical liberal tradition, on the participation of individuals as distinct from the community in which
47. WILLIAI J. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY,THE
UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 61 (1987).
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they lived. The language of "participatoryjustice," in contrast, is
built on the premise that "Human life is life in community."48
Starting from the belief that an individual finds fulfillment
through participating in his or her community, the primary goal
of public policy regarding the poor should be "to enable them to
become active participants in the life of society."4 9 In other
words, developing the community in ways which enhance the
opportunity structure for individuals transfers power to both the
individual and the community. Basing public policy at all levels
of government on the interlocking ideas of subsidiarity and participatory justice, policy makers need to focus on, not a numerical level of participation in any given community, but on
measures which seek to strengthen social and economic institutions in the community itself, thereby expanding the structure of
opportunity for the individuals in the area.
Community development corporations (CDC), as described
by Mitchell Sviridoff, founding president of the Local Initiatives
Support Corporation (LISC), seem to be the best existing indigenous response to the problems of the modern city.
The CDC is a non-profit, community-based organization
governed by a board consisting primarily of neighborhood
residents and business leadership, generally found in distressed neighborhoods, and dedicated to the revitalization
of a discrete geographical area usually defined by traditional neighborhood boundaries.50
There are hundreds of CDCs around the country, of varying
sizes, each working to strengthen its community, to address the
needs of fellow residents and to reestablish contact with the
broader social, political and economic system. As Sviridoff
writes, "This is where the education and development of community leadership and institutional capacity begins. And this, too, is
where begins the offensive against disorganization and chaos."'
In fact, community-based, nonprofit organizations, have been
spearheading a drive to establish beachheads of hope against
overwhelming odds. Not all are successful; many fail within a few
years of incorporation. However, over the past few decades
"community-based organizations have built nearly 125,000 units
of housing, most of it for low-income families; developed 16.4
48.
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million square feet of retail space, offices, industrial parks, and
other industrial developments in economically distressed communities where for-profit developers would not venture; and
accounted for the creation and retention of nearly 90,000
jobs."5 2 This uniquely American blend of public and private, selfhelp and local initiative with government support, combines
grass-roots organizing with entrepreneurial skills to create a
promising structure for the channeling of funds without fostering dependency or enlarging bureaucracy. It transcends the
traditional liberal/conservative ideological antagonism, which
represents a refreshing development in itself. While tracing their
roots back to the community organizations of the sixties, CDCs,
over the past twenty years, have become increasingly sophisticated in their ability to coordinate and patch together complex
financing from public and private sources for refurbishing, constructing and managing low-cost housing, often with child care
services provided; bringing businesses into the area and creating
jobs; providing needed social services and job training to unemployed residents; helping inner city entrepreneurs with low-interest loans, start-up capital and "incubator" space; and establishing
a focal point for neighborhood organization.5 3 This
entrepreneurial approach, though a far cry from sixties-style
community action, still includes, for many CDCs, a strong political and advocacy element. As Peter Dreier writes, "While historically skeptical of mainstream politics, these groups became
[during the 1980s] increasingly engaged in electoral politics,
helping to elect their own, and other, activists."54 By drawing
together financing from multiple sources - Federal agencies,
foundations, businesses, commercial banks, community foundations, city governments, State governments - CDCs not only
make economic and social development possible in their area,
they also act as the link which reconnects a socially isolated part
of a city with the broader municipal community.
The relations between community organizations and city
hall have also changed with the times. In 1986, then-Mayor of
Denver Federico Pena (now Secretary of Transportation) said in
an interview with Neil Peirce and Carol Steinbach:
52. Michael A. Stegman, National Urban Policy Revisited, 71 N.C. L. REV.
1737, 1775 (1993).
53. See NEI. R. PIERCE & CAROL F. STEINBACH, CoRREcrVE CAPITALISM:
TilE RISE OF AMERICA'S COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATIONS (1987); see also
DAVID OSBORNE, LABORATORIES OF DEMOCRACY (1990).

54. Peter Drier, America's Urban Crisis: Symptoms, Causes, Solutions, 71 N.C.
L. REV. 1351, 1399 (1993).
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"The atmosphere has changed across the United States....

City governments are opening their doors. If you're a community activist and do your nuts-and-bolts work, you'll get a
response from the city." With federal aid cutbacks, Pena
said, "we'd be foolish not to find alternative funds from city
coffers to make CDC projects work.
They're a wise invest55
ment for the future of the city."
A change, too, can seen in the fact that whereas a communitybased coalition like The Woodlawn Organization (TWO) in Chicago in the early sixties would organize rent strikes to force
slumlords to bring housing stock up to code, in the eighties and
nineties, it is more likely that a neighborhood CDC itself would
be the owner of the housing stock, representing a profound
change for the better in the economic and political dynamics of
low-cost housing.
Community development corporations, both tax-exempt
501 (c) (3) entities and profit making subsidiary spin-offs, could
be the centerpiece of a renewed governmental effort to expand
democratic and economic participation in our troubled inner cities. Peter Dreier advocates that " [f lederal programs must provide
seed capital, equity, and loans to community-based groups and
small for-profit entrepreneurs to support neighborhood-based
job creation projects. Senator Edward Kennedy recently proposed a National Community Economic Partnership Act along
these lines."5 6 Increased Federal monies could be channeled
through the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG)
offices of city governments with the mandate that the funds be
for the support of community organizations or be used to
improve city services (community policing, garbage collection,
street lighting, etc.) in areas where municipalities are working
with CDCs. Cities can help beginning CDCs through transferring to them land which the city repossessed due to nonpayment
of taxes. Stegman suggests the use of other preexisting administrative structures in support of community-based organizations.
One example is targeting the $2 billion a year in public
housing modernization funds that the Congress already
appropriates to local public housing authorities to train
inner city youth in the construction trades. Another example would be to use federal laws such as the Community
Reinvestment Act 5 7 and the Home Mortgage Disclosure
55.
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Act 58 to stimulate a continual flow of financial capital into
minority and other distressed communities; and to create a
network of local community development banks in inner
city areas to support business enterprise, microlending programs, etc. 59
Federal enforcement of existing laws which require reinvestment
and which prohibit racial discrimination in employment would
go a long way toward supporting local community-based efforts
at revitalization. But public financial support is essential, as
Franklin A. Thomas, President of the Ford Foundation, wrote in
the Foreword to Peirce and Steinbach's report:
Despite the considerable good that has flowed from the
"new localism," in fact no substantial development among
the poorest communities and people is achievable without
an adequate flow of public resources. Nor is it realistic to
believe that the current revenue bases of state and local
governments will be sufficient to compensate for the lack
of federal funding. Given the amounts and types of subsidies required in most community development projects,
there is no substitute for the federal presence. °
There are reasons to be cautiously optimistic that the Clinton
Administration's urban policy will develop along these lines.6 1
Place specific policies which seek to bring individuals back
into the broader political and economic system through nurturing local community institutions and leadership offer the most
promise for expanding democratic participation in the nineties.
The administrative structures already exist, though in some cities
only in embryo. Support of these organizations avoids the problem of creating dependency, while refusing the inhumane consequences of laizzez-faire capitalism. Community development
corporations, as an organizational and administrative concept,
offer at least a glimmer of hope that, given the political will, we as
a nation can move closer toward being a society where individuals in our inner cities can achieve a greater degree of self-fulfillment because they live in a community in which that selffulfillment is possible.
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